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Abstract
In early 1990s, Jamison, Mosley and others concluded that a profound demographic and
consequent epidemiological transition is taking place in developing countries. According to
this classical model, by the year 2015, infectious diseases will account for only about 20% of
deaths in developing countries as chronic diseases become more pronounced. These impend-
ing demographic and epidemiological transitions were to dominate the health sector reform
agenda in developing countries. Following an analysis of fertility, mortality and other
demographic and epidemiological data from South Asian and other developing countries, the
paper argues that the classical model is in need of re-evaluation. A number of new
‘challenges’ have complicated the classical interplay of demographic and epidemiological
factors. These new challenges include continuing population growth in some countries, rapid
unplanned urbanization, the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Sub-Saharan Africa (and its impending
threat in South Asia), and globalization and increasing marginalisation of developing
countries. While the traditional lack of investment in human development makes the
developing countries more vulnerable to the vicissitudes of globalization, increasing eco-
nomic weakness of their governments forces them to retreat further from the social sector.
Pockets of poverty and deprivation, therefore, persist giving rise to three simultaneous
burdens for South Asia and much of the rest of the developing world: continuing communi-
cable diseases, increasing burden of chronic diseases, and increasing demand for both
primary and tertiary levels of health care services. While these complex factors, on the one
hand, underscore the need for health sector reform, on the other, they make the task much
more difficult and challenging. The paper emphasizes the need to revisit the classical model
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of demographic and epidemiological transition. It is argued that the health sector in
developing countries must be aware of and effectively address these ‘new challenges’.
Although it has included data from many developing countries, the focus is primarily on
South Asia. © 2002 Elsevier Science Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Demographic transition; Epidemiological transition; Debt burden
1. Introduction
In recent years, almost all countries, including those in South Asia, have
embarked on health sector reform, in varying degrees. The goals of health sector
reform, in a formal sense, remain the achievement of efficiency, improving qual-
ity, preserving or promoting equity, and generating new resources for health
care. However, the ‘urge’ to reform varies from country to country. Often re-
form is initiated by a conscious policy to strengthen or improve the health care
system. In some cases, the urge for reform comes from a desire to join the
global market through ‘economic liberalization’. In an increasing number of
developing countries, like Pakistan, who are currently faced with precarious eco-
nomic situation, social sector reform is dictated more by donor agencies, primar-
ily the World Bank and the IMF, than by any rational policy decision.
Consequently, such reform seldom takes into account broader social, economic,
demographic and epidemiological changes that have serious implications for the
health sector [14].
The paper critically examines the implications of four interconnected forces on
the health sector in South Asia and other developing countries-economic global-
ization and information/communication revolution, demographic transition, epi-
demiological transition, and urbanization. It argues that the classical notion of
demographic transition leading to epidemiological one did not materialized fully
in developing countries. This is particularly so in the countries of South Asia.
The process is made much more complex by the forces of unplanned urbaniza-
tion, globalization and information-communication revolution with serious impli-
cations for health sector reform. Although some figures from other countries
have often been noted, the focus remains on Pakistan, India and Bangladesh.
2. Demographic-epidemiological transition: the classical model
A number of scholars, such as Jamison, Mosley, and Henderson [2] have aptly
documented the relationship between demographic transition, epidemiological
transition and health transition. In the World Bank’s seminal book [3], the
authors (Jamison, Mosley, Measham and Bobadilla) presented the following
model to illustrate the relationship between these three transitions (Fig. 1).
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In short, with increasing urbanization and industrialization (and expanding
education and improved medical and public health technology), the fertility declines
with a resulting aging of the population. Concurrently, there is a decline in
mortality attributable to infectious diseases and a corresponding increase of that
from chronic diseases. This classical model obviously derives from the historical
trend observed in the developed countries since the industrial revolution some two
hundred years ago.
The model has its own logic and dominated much of the thinking of developing
country health researchers and scholars over the last two decades. It must be
recognized that changes in mortality, fertility and in the age structure of the
population along with the social and economic changes outlined in this classical
model would have significant implications for health and health care. The demo-
graphic transition is to be followed by an epidemiological transition in which the
burden of disease will shift from infectious to chronic diseases. With the aging of
the population, the causes of mortality, in the long run, are sure to change from
infectious diseases to chronic ones. Jamison [4] predicted that in developing
countries mortality attributable to infectious diseases would decline from 39% in
1985 to 19% by 2015. Chronic diseases, correspondingly, are expected to increase
their share in mortality (Table 1). These epidemiological and demographic changes
would drive the health sector reform agenda [5].
Over the last forty years, all regions of the developing world had been experienc-
ing a demographic transition. According to the World Bank [6], in Low-income
economies, the total fertility rate (TFR) declined from 6.0 in 1970 to 3.8 in 1991.
By the year 2000, it is projected to decline further to 3.2. During the same period,
Fig. 1. Source: Jamison, Mosley, Measham and Bobadilla, Disease control priorities in developing
countries, World Bank, Washington DC, 1993.
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Table 1
Shifting burden of disease 1985–2015
Developed (%) Developing (%)Disease category
1985 201520151985
Infectious 7 36 199
Neoplasm 718 1418
7 1453Circulatory 50
00 1 1Pregnancy related
8 5Perinatal 1 1
8 756Injury
1615 21 19Other
Total 100.0100.0 100.0100.0
37.9 47.812.0 14.5Total deaths (millions)
Source: Jamison et al. (1993) [3].
the TFR in Middle-income economies declined from 5.0 in 1970 to 3.2 in 1991 and
to 3.1 (projected) in 2000. The South Asian countries underwent similar demo-
graphic transition. In India, the TFR was 5.9 in 1960; by 1998, it decreased to 3.1
[7]. The TFR in Bangladesh, declined from 6.7 in 1960 to 3.1 in 1998; while for
Pakistan, the corresponding figures are 7.0 and 5.1, a relatively modest decline of
27.1% over quarter of a century (Table 2).
This decline in TFR assumes greater significance when considered in the context
of a still expanding base. Over the last thirty years, ‘women of childbearing age as
a percentage of all women’ increased from 44 (1965) to 48 (1991) in Bangladesh;
from 48 (1965) to 50 (1991) in India; and from 43 (1965) to 45 (1991) in Pakistan
[8]. True to the pattern of demographic transition, the Crude Death Rate (per 1000
population) also declined over the years. For Low-income countries the CDR
declined from 14 in 1970 to 10 in 1991 and the corresponding figures for the
Middle-income countries are 11 and 8 [6]. These are accompanied by a significant
increase in life expectancy at birth in almost all developing countries, including the
three South Asian ones. Life expectancy at birth in Bangladesh rose from 44 years
in 1970 to 58 years in 1998; while in India, it increased from 49 years to 63 years
during the same period. The corresponding figures for Pakistan are 49 and 64 years
[7] (Table 3).
Table 2
Total fertility rate decline 1960–1998
BangladeshIndiaPakistanIranIndonesia
7.20 7.00 5.901960 6.705.50
1990 4.903.10 6.00 3.80 4.30
2.501998 2.80 5.10 3.10 3.10
Source: The state of the world’s children, UNICEF (2000) [7].
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Table 3
Decreasing crude death rates and increasing life expectancy in selected developing countries
Life expectancy at birthCrude death rate (per 1000 population)
1970 19981970 1998
44.021.0 58.0Bangladesh 10.0
49.0India 63.017.0 9.0
49.0 64.08.0Pakistan 19.0
5.016.0 55.0 69.0Iran
48.0 65.07.0Indonesia 18.0
Source: The state of the world’s children, UNICEF (2000) [7].
Despite the demographic transition and the corresponding gains, the pre-
dictable epidemiological transition is yet to take hold in most countries of the
developing world. The classical model put forward by Jamison et al. [3] largely
remain unrealized due to certain complicating factors that were not clearly evi-
dent even a decade ago. These factors are the new challenges facing the health
sector in much of the developing world. These new challenges, on the one hand,
underscore the need for health sector reform and, on the other, makes the task of
carrying such reform extremely difficult if not impossible.
3. Health sector reform attempts in South Asia: poverty of planning
South Asian countries, over the last four or five decades have undertaken some
health sector reform initiatives. However, they have achieved little tangible re-
sults. Pakistan, for example, undertook three major health sector reform initia-
tives over the last thirty years. Soon after the Alma Ata declaration, Pakistan
introduced the Basic Health Unit (BHU) and Rural Health Center (RHC) initia-
tive as the hub of primary health care. In an hierarchical order, these First Level
Care Facilities were to link with the First Level Referral Facilities called Tehsil/
Taluka or Thana Headquarter Hospitals (THQs). Next above were to be the
Secondary Level Hospitals at District Headquarters (DHQs). The Tertiary Level
Facilities were to top the hierarchy [9]. Conceptually, it was a well-planned
scheme. However, acute scarcity of resources at the lowest level, the villages, and
at other levels of the hierarchy made the system rather ineffective. A recent
survey discovered that only 25% of the BHUs or RHCs have duly qualified
female health professionals; and only about 15% of the THQs have decent
emergency obstetric service [10]. With a view to address this scarcity of health
care resource at the village level, in 1994 Pakistan introduced another program
called the ‘Prime Minister’s Program on Family Planning and Primary Health
Care’. Recently renamed as ‘the National Program’, it envisaged placement of
trained health workers in each village to provide basic maternal and child health
services. These Lady Health Workers (LHW), recruited from within the village,
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were to act as the first point of contact for women. It was planned that there would
be 1 LHW for 1000 people by 1998. However, due to lack of financial resources and
misplaced priority, Pakistan failed to reach the target. By the end of the century, it
had only about 45 000 LHWs, far short of 140 000 needed to cover the population
of almost 140 million. Moreover, while the public health care system is a provincial
responsibility, the LHWs remain under the National Program managed by the
Federal Ministry of Health. This vertical nature of the program makes integration
of health care services, particularly primary health care, at the village level, difficult.
Consequently, much of the beds earmarked for women at the THQs remain
severely underutilized. A World Bank report in 1997 aptly demonstrated the
inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the system [11].
Pakistan’s latest reform strategy is the recently announced Devolution Plan. The
National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB), set up soon after the military takeover in
October 1999, announced the plan for devolution of power to elected governments
at the district level throughout the country. The NRB found the existing system to
be ‘colonial’ in nature and perpetuating the ‘rural–urban divide’. It concluded: ‘in
the existing system of governance at the local level, the province governs the
districts and Tehsils directly through the bureaucracy at the division, district and
Tehsil levels. And the local government for towns and cities exist separately from
those of the rural areas. The provincial bureaucratic set ups are the designated
‘controlling authorities’ of the local governments, and tend to undermine and
over-ride them, which breeds a colonial relationship of ‘ruler’ and ‘subject’. The
separate local government structures engender rural–urban antagonism, while the
administration’s role as ‘controlling authorities’ accentuates the rural–urban divide’
[12].
The devolution plan is an answer to these ‘two structural and systemic disjoints’.
It is meant to introduce ‘one coherent structure in which the district administration
and the police are answerable to the elected chief executive of the district’.
Although local elections are being held in stage, the precise structural framework of
the local government envisaged at the district level is yet to be fully spelled out.
Nevertheless, NRB is emphatic in declaring that ‘The Local Government is based
on five fundamentals: devolution of political power, decentralization of administra-
tive authority, deconcentration of management functions, diffusion of the power-
authority nexus, and distribution of resources to the district level. It is designed so
that the genuine interests of the people are served and their rights safeguarded. The
new system will create an enabling environment in which people can start partici-
pating in community welfare and be the masters of their own destiny’ [12].
The Devolution Plan, it should be noted, has used four different terms to refer to
the soon-to-be introduced governance system: deolution (political power), decen-
tralization (administrative authority), deconcentration (management functions), and
diffusion (power-authority nexus). These terms indicate different levels of decision-
space to be accorded in different aspects to the new local government. While the
intended decision-space (in the planned devolution exercise) is much wider in terms
of political power, it is much narrower in the sphere of management functions [12].
These functional issues will definitely be further discussed and refined as the
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devolution process is implemented. The devolution exercise, undoubtedly, will have
significant implications for the health sector. It calls for the abolition of the
‘division’ as an ‘administrative tier’ necessitating the abolition of the existing
position of Divisional Director General of Health. The Plan creates a powerful
position of District Coordination Officer (DCO) representing the provincial bureau-
cratic structure at the district level. Although the elected Zila Nazim will be the
executive head of the district with some limited supervisory ‘control’ over the DCO
(such as, premature transfer, performance appraisal), it is the DCO who would
oversee all government services at the district level. According to the Devolution
Plan, health services to be delivered at the district level include: ‘Public Health,
Environment, Basic and Rural Health Units, Child and Women Health, and
Population Welfare. The Medical Superintendent(s) of hospitals will also function
under this office’ [12].
It is apparent that the Devolution Plan has the potential to bring about
significant changes in the way health care services are managed and delivered at the
district level. However, it is a political plan, devised by a military government
seeking legitimacy, with the declared intention of ‘introducing genuine’ democracy
in the country. All political parties are opposed to the Plan and public enthusiasm
is rather mute. Consequently, the Devolution Plan and its future remain in doubt.
Moreover, the dire economic situation in Pakistan makes the sustainability of
district governments highly questionable. Even LHWs (federal government em-
ployees) often complain of not receiving their salaries for months at a time [13].
Non-payment of salaries due to lack of funds seems to be more common among
provincial government employees. Under these circumstances, the viability of
district governments is a wide open question.
Bangladesh, since 1970s, initiated a number of health sector programs. Perhaps
the most successful and widely acclaimed is the National Family Planning Program.
It has ‘achieved an impressive fertility decline since the mid 1980s. The TFR halved
from around seven in the 1970s to 3.3 in 1996–1997. Bangladesh’s fertility decline
has been particularly impressive, given that the country lacks many of the socioeco-
nomic conditions that have historically marked fertility decline’ [14]. Unreserved
political commitment to the family planning program since gaining independence
from Pakistan in 1971, contributed significantly to this success.
In other areas of health care, however, Bangladesh showed little initiative. The
family planning program remained so paramount in terms of its importance that it
consumed bulk of the resources of the state. Non-government organizations in
Bangladesh also, by and large, concentrated on ‘development’ related issues (such
as, income generation through microcredit, or adult education) rather than on
health. The Gonoshasthya Kendra (People’s Health Center) is the only NGO in
Bangladesh that had been involved in the health sector since its inception during
the struggle for independence in 1971. Popularly known as GK, it has grown into
a large health institution providing primary health care, health education, illness
prevention and secondary level curative care. It has an extensive social insurance-
based network of primary health care system in villages around Savar, outside the
capital Dhaka, including a pharmaceutical factory [15].
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Nevertheless, for the first decade of its life Bangladesh largely ignored the issue
of health sector reform. In 1982, following the recommendations of an Expert
Committee, the then military government of Bangladesh promulgated a Drug
(Control) Ordinance. ‘The policy’s basic strategy was to exclude all non-essential
drugs from the country, rather than to promote essential drugs in the public sector
while allowing the coexistence of a broader private market. The policy created a
restricted national formulary of 150 essential drugs and 100 specialist drugs, with 12
at the health post level, 45 for primary health care, and the full list at tertiary
hospitals. The act banned about 1700 drugs from production or sale. The ordinance
also included measures to promote local manufacture and to restrict foreign firms
within Bangladesh’ [16]. However, faced with stiff opposition from the medical
establishment within the country, and multinational drug companies, the military
government had to dilute the policy significantly. The fact that it was a military
government that lacked legitimacy also contributed to this fiasco. The same military
regime introduced a new national health policy that proposed radical changes in the
health care system. This time too, the regime faced stiff opposition from the
medical establishment and other interest groups within the country. Around this
time, a mass movement against military rule gained momentum and the regime fell
within a year. With the fall of the military dictatorship, the health policy also
unraveled.
Bangladesh did not embark on any other major health sector reform for almost
a decade. In late 1990s, the government took an initiative to introduce ‘comprehen-
sive reproductive health services’ at the Thana level (the lowest level of the
administrative structure with a police headquarter). As of 1998, Bangladesh had
493 Thanas (also called Upzilla) and the new initiative calls for the establishment/
enhancement of the Thana level secondary hospital with adequate women’s and
children’s health care facilities, including emergency obstetric services by the year
2003. However, acute scarcity of resources and inefficiency of the system are
making it difficult to achieve the target. It is important to note that Bangladesh has
more physicians (1 doctor per 4671 people) than nurses (1 nurse per 8066 people)
or midwives (1 per 9300 people). Its per capita government expenditure on health
and family welfare (includes the family planning program) was only Taka 132 (or
$3.50) in 1996–1997 [17]. This represents a slight decline in government expenditure
on health and family welfare from the previous year (it was Taka 139 per capita in
1995). It is too early to predict the ultimate fate of this new initiative.
India, the biggest South Asian country, is a diverse land with an estimated (2000)
population of more than 1 billion distributed in an area of more of 3.16 million
square kilometers. Seventh largest country in the world in landmass, India is
politically divided into 25 States, each with substantial autonomy, and seven Union
Territories with lesser degree of autonomy. The Indian States differ greatly in term
of size (geographic area), population volume and characteristics (linguistic and
religious distribution of population) and, most importantly, in terms of their level
of social and economic development. A vast majority of its population (73.2%,
1998) is still live in rural areas. Despite macroeconomic growth since independence
in 1947, three-fourths of India’s population is estimated to live below or at
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subsistence level, most of them in rural areas. India’s rapid population growth,
which increased from 340 million in 1951 to 844 million in 1991, to 984 million in
1998 and crossed the billion mark sometime in 1999, is partly responsible for this
continued poverty despite macroeconomic growth.
This vastness and diversity of the Indian federating units made it difficult for the
central government to introduce and finance any national-wide comprehensive
health sector reform. Between 1947 and 1980, the Indian government formed a
number of committees to come up with strategic policy directions for the health
care system. The Bhore Committee of 1946 was constituted by the departing British
colonial power. This was followed by the Mudaliar Committee of 1961, the first
national health committee set by independent India. The Jain Committee (1966),
the Kartar Singh Committee (1974), the Srivastava Committee (1975) and finally
the ICMR–ICSSR Joint Panel of 1980—all recommended various measures to
strengthen the health care system. All these committees emphasized the provision of
universal primary health care to all Indians irrespective of their place of residence
or economic means. In response, India came out with its first National Health
Policy in 1983 that established the provision of ‘universal, comprehensive primary
health care services, relevant to actual needs and priorities of the community’ as the
most important goal [18].
India largely failed to successfully implement this National Health Policy. In
States where the state-level governments were committed to the overall thrust of the
National Health Policy, the health care system experienced necessary structural and
programmatic changes to make it more equitable and preventive in nature. These
States, like Kerala, for example, achieved remarkable success in developing an
equitable health care system by investing in ‘social’ sectors (education in particular).
Consequently, Kerala has health status indicators that are almost comparable to
those of some of the developed countries. On the other hand, other parts of India,
primarily its vast rural hinterland, remained most impoverished in terms of leading
health status indicators [19]. In short, the National Health policy of 1983 remains
largely unfulfilled.
Since the early 1990s, India embarked on the path of ‘liberalization’ of the
economy. This liberalization and the resultant Structural Adjustment Program
introduced far-reaching changes in the Indian economy. With privatization of the
economy, foreign investment grew, especially from the Non-Resident Indians
(NRIs). So far as the health sector is concerned, two parallel changes occurred;
steady reduction in the financial contribution from the Central government for
health care at the State level and increasing privatization and corporatization of the
health care sector. According to a study, the Central government’s contribution fell
from 19.9% of the States’ health budget during 1974–1982 to only 3.3% in
1992–1993 [20]. Liberalization also brought foreign investment in the health sector,
particularly in hospital and diagnostics services. Their target was to cater to the
curative service needs of the growing middle class. Their focus, therefore, is on
tertiary level services with modern diagnostic technology. Needless to say, major
metropolitan cities of India are the prime beneficiaries of this corporatization of the
health sector [21]. Consequently, the Health care system in India is increasingly
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becoming more inequitable. While almost 74% of its population live in rural areas,
only 31% of India’s hospitals and 20% of hospital beds are in rural areas. Even
dispensaries are in short supply (only 43%) in rural areas. On the other hand, 68%
of its hospitals and 61% of the dispensaries are in the private sector. It is apparent
that the health sector in India needs fundamental restructuring based on a judicious
public–private mix and the principle of equity [22].
4. Population growth: a continuing challenge
First of all, in a number of developing countries, the big ones, the population is
still increasing quite rapidly and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future.
Consequently, the population of these countries will double within the next twenty
to forty years straining the available resources. The six biggest developing coun-
tries—India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Egypt—had a com-
bined population of about 1.7 billion in 1999 [23], more than 28% of the world’s
total. With an average growth rate of 2.1% (1990–1999), the population of these
countries will double within the next twenty-five to forty years. The population of
Pakistan is expected to double in 24 years, that of India in 37 years, and the
population of Egypt and Indonesia in 32 and 43 years, respectively (Table 4). Such
a rapid population growth will undoubtedly put pressure on the scarce resources for
health care and make the task of health sector reform profoundly challenging and
difficult.
5. HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa: social collapse?
While one part of the developing world is faced with the consequences of rapid
population growth, another part is on the verge of total social collapse due to the
deaths and destruction brought about by a single catastrophic disease—HIV/AIDS
[24]. If the world does not find the political will to respond immediately and
Table 4
Population and growth rate: six largest developing countries
Population (millions) Population growth rate (1990–1999)
(%)(1999)
1.8998.1India
1.5209.3Indonesia
152.3 2.8Pakistan
126.9 1.7Bangladesh
2.5Nigeria 108.9
2.0Egypt 67.2
2.1Average growthTotal 1663.7
Source: World health report, World Health Organization (2000) [23].
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Table 5
Sub-Saharan Africa: the HIV/AIDS pandemic
Number infected % of Adult populationCountry
110 000 2.12Angola
Botswana 25.10190 000
9.312 500 000Ethiopia
11.641 600 000Kenya
1.4561 000Niger
12.912 800 000South Africa
1 400 000 25.84Zimbabwe
Source: UNAIDS (1999) [24].
effectively to this pandemic, much of Sub-Saharan Africa will face the prospect of
an economic and social collapse within the next quarter of a century. HIV/AIDS
pandemic is about to strike other developing countries too, including the giant
India. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the issue of health sector is so overwhelmed with this
single disease that the issue of reform to improve quality, equity or technical and/or
allocative efficiency seems rather comical (Table 5).
6. Unplanned urbanization: poverty and environmental degradation
Another ‘new’ challenge is that of ‘unplanned’ urbanization. Throughout the
developing world, urbanization is on the rise. According to the World Bank,
low-income countries experienced an annual growth rate 3.7% in its urban popula-
tion throughout the last thirty years (and it is still continuing). The urban
population in Low-income countries increased from 18% in 1970 to 39% in 1991.
During the same period, the percentage of urban population in middle-income
countries went up from 46 to 62% [23].
Globally speaking, for the first time in human history, urban dwellers are poised
to outnumber their rural counterparts. In the Third World, along with overall
urbanization, there is an emergence of mega cities, often one or two in a country
dwarfing others. In 1950 out of the 20 largest cities in the world, only seven were
in developing countries (including Argentina and Brazil). By 1990, 13 of these mega
cities were located in the developing countries. It is projected that by the year 2015,
the developed industrialized world would be able to boast about having only three
of these 20 mega cities [25]. In 1990, only three cities from the sub-continent, all
Indian (Bombay, Calcutta and Delhi) made this elite club of 20. In 2015, there will
be five—one each from Pakistan and Bangladesh— joining them. It is projected
that by 2015, Bombay will have a population of 27.2 million— the largest city in
South Asia. With a population of 20.8 million, Karachi will follow it. Dhaka, with
a projected population of 19 million will not be far behind. Calcutta and New
Delhi, with a population of 17.9 million each, are the other two metropolises from
the sub-continent. Mexico City, Lagos, Jakarta, Cairo, Manila, and Istanbul are
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examples of other fast growing metropolises in the developing world (Table 6). By
2015, these 11 developing country mega cities (excluding those in China, Brazil, and
Argentina) will have a combined population of 209 million—56% of the total for
the 20 mega cities in the world.
Urbanization, in itself, is not the issue. The problem is the nature of urbanization
in these countries. Unlike in the developed world, urbanization in developing
countries is not the result of industrialization or economic growth, but a conse-
quence of rural poverty and deprivation. People flock to cities in search of a
livelihood, however, precarious that could be. Draught, floods or cyclones in rural
areas push a large number of people every year to migrate to the cities, primarily
to the capital or the biggest metropolis in the country. These rural migrants put
further pressure on the already scarce resources and infrastructure in the cities.
The result is further growth of urban slums, environmental degradation and
poverty [26]. It is variously estimated that about 40% of the people in these Third
World metropolises live in slums with little access to safe drinking water, sanitation
or primary health care. These slums, in turn, emerge as pockets of deprived
humanity. Communicable diseases—resurgent tuberculosis, malaria and di-
Table 6
Mega cities: 20 largest cities of the world (1950, 1990 and 2015 population, in millions)
1950 CityCityCity 1990 2015
population populationpopulation
12.3 Tokyo 25.0 Tokyo 28.9New York
27.2Bombay16.0London New York8.7
24.6Mexico CityTokyo 15.06.7 Lagos
Paris 23.1Shanghai14.8Sao Paulo5.4
Jakarta13.3 21.1Shanghai5.3Shanghai
20.9BombayBuenos Airs 12.05.0 Sao Paulo
4.9 Los AngelesChicago 11.3 Karachi 20.8
Moscow 4.8 Beijing 10.9 Beijing 19.6
19.0Dhaka10.8Calcutta Calcutta4.4
18.9Los Angeles Mexico City10.7Buenos Aires4.0
10.7Seoul New York3.9Beijing 17.9
17.9OsakaOsaka 10.33.8 Calcutta
17.9Delhi9.8Milan Rio de Janeiro3.6
3.1 9.7Mexico City TianjinParis 17.0
14.7Tianjin 9.7 Metro ManilaPhiladelphia 2.9
14.5Cairo2.9Bombay Jakarta 9.7
Moscow 9.2 Los Angeles2.9 14.3Rio de Janeiro
2.8 Cairo 9.0 SeoulDetroit 13.1
2.8 Delhi 8.0 Buenos Aires 12.2Naples
12.1Istanbul2.6 8.0Leningrad Metro Manila
375.7Total 92.8 233.9
% Increase 60.6152.0
Source: The state of the world’s population, UNFPA (1996) [25].
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Table 7
Rate of illiteracy in selected developing countries, 1995
Country Illiteracy Rate 1995
Male Female
51 74Bangladesh
6236Egypt
6536India
7460Ethiopia
8146Nepal
Nigeria 34 53
7646Pakistan
Senegal 57 77
Source: The state of the world’s children, UNICEF (2000) [7].
arrhea— take a heavy toll in these urban slums. Often lost in the macro-level
analysis, the health care systems in these countries are faced with the new challenge
of providing essential primary health care services to the impoverished growing
slum dwellers.
7. Investment in the social sector: historical neglect
Most of the developing countries, especially those in South Asia and Africa,
traditionally made little investment in the social sector like education and health
[27–29]. Consequently, these societies still suffer from a high level of illiteracy,
particularly among women even after four or five decades of independence (Table
7).
Moreover, a number of these countries continue to invest less in education or
health than in the military/defense. Again, the South Asian countries, particularly
Pakistan and India seem to be most notorious in this regard [28] (Table 8). This
lack of development of the human capital, on the one hand, contributed to their
continued underdevelopment and, on the other, prolonged the dominance of
communicable diseases. The impact of the interconnected pathways of illiteracy,
poverty, malnutrition, ill health and disease is most pronounced in these developing
countries [30,31]. In other words, these societies, clustered mostly in South Asia, are
reaping the ‘benefits’ of their long history of neglecting the social sector.
While historical neglect of the social sector is crippling these countries, globaliza-
tion and its apparent negative consequences are fast narrowing the maneuvering
room for them [26]. Globalization, contrary the initial euphoria, seems to be
increasing the economic muscle of the multinational corporations (MNCs) at the
expense of the nation states. Not surprisingly, the economic strength of the Third
World countries increasingly looks puny in comparison with that of the MNCs
(Table 9). For example, the General Motors in 1999 had a revenue ($189.1 billion)
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Table 8
Public expenditure on health and the military 1995 (selected developing countries)
Country Public expenditure (as % of GDP) on
Health Military
Bangladesh 1.71.2
1.6Egypt 5.7
India 0.7 2.4
0.7Indonesia 1.8
0.3Nigeria 0.8
Pakistan 0.8 6.1
4.6Sri Lanka 1.4
4.02.0Zimbabwe
Source: World development report, World Bank, 1998/99 [27].
three times larger than the GDP of Pakistan ($64.4 billion). The 1999 revenue of
the Departmental store giant Wal-Mart ($168.8 billion) was larger than the
combined GDP in that year of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Tanzania, Cambo-
dia, Kenya, Nepal, Vietnam and Zambia [32]. As the MNCs become increasingly
stronger, the poorer countries lose their ability to independently develop and
implement policies for the social sector.
8. The debt burden and privatization of health care
Another direct or indirect consequence seems to be the increasing debt burden of
the developing countries [27]. In some countries the debt burden is so high that
interest payments on the debt consume an increasingly significant portion of the
Table 9
Globalization: increasing inequality?
1997 Population (in millions)1999 Revenue (in billions) 10 biggest Country GDP (billion
MNCs $)
189.1 PakistanGeneral motors 64.4 137.0
32.8Wal-Mart Bangladesh 124.0168.8
163.9Exxon-Mobil Tanzania 6.7 31.0
162.6 118.0Ford motors 36.5Nigeria
111.6 CambodiaGeneral electric 3.1 11.0
IBM Egypt87.5 60.075.5
82.0Citigroup 9.9 28.0Kenya
4.9AT & T 23.062.4 Nepal
Philip Morris Vietnam 4.5 77.061.8
Boeing Zambia 3.6 9.058.0
Sources: MNCs, the daily dawn, Karachi, April 30, 2000; GDP/population, world development report,
World Bank, 1998/99 [27].
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Table 10
The debt burden: a growing constraint
Present value (% of GNP)External debt (total millions of $)Country
19961980 1996
Pakistan 399931 29 901
11431 403Nigeria 8921
16 0834230 30Bangladesh
22India 20 581 89 827
6468933383Kenya
31 40319 131 35Egypt
2413205 26Nepal
16171133261Zambia
114Tanzania 2452 7412
1108118Jordan 1971
Syria 21 420 1203552
Source: World development report, World Bank, 1998/99 [27].
budget. Pakistan’s external debt in 1996 stood at 39% of its GNP, while for
Bangladesh, foreign debt amounted to 30% of its GNP in 1996. The external debt
of these two South Asian countries is rising each year. On the other hand, the
external debt burden of Nigeria and Tanzania stood at 114%, of their respective
GNP in 1996. Zambia’s external debt burden in 1996 was more than 161% of its
GNP (Table 10). These highly indebted countries spend an enormous amount of
their resources in servicing their debts leaving little resources for other public
sectors. The government of Pakistan, for example, spends 45% of its budget on
servicing its external debt. In other words, the government of Pakistan is literary
left with little resources to devote to health or education. It may be recalled,
Pakistan spends a high proportion of its resources on national defense.
The debt burden is seriously reducing the ability of these countries to finance
essential health and other services. Consequently, governments are ‘downloading’
these services to the private sector [33,34]. In most developing countries, health care
is being increasingly dominated by the private sector [20–22]—out-of-pocket
expenses outstripping public expense on health care. In India, a whooping 87% of
the expenses on health care is ‘private’ [27].
In Pakistan, the private sector accounts for 77% of the total health care expenses
(Table 11). Private resources, by its very nature, are primarily directed at tertiary
level care. As a private sector entrepreneur would prefer to build and run a
for-profit hospital rather than a Basic Health Unit in a rural setting, individuals too
are more willing to spend their ‘pocket money’ on surgery rather than health
promotion/illness prevention exercise. This shifting of burden for health care from
the public to the private sector, therefore, disproportionately affect primary health
care services including health promotion and illness prevention activities. Con-
versely, health is increasingly becoming a private good to be available as a
commodity to the people who can afford the price. This leaves the vast majority of
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the poor and the disadvantaged at the mercy of the market forces. As communica-
ble diseases and poverty are more closely linked, this process of privatization
increases the burden of the poor and the disadvantaged.
The information/communication revolution that marks the current era also
promotes tertiary level care. Multi-channel television and the Internet seldom carry
much on the virtue of safe drinking water or sanitation. However, they do
demonstrate the value of high-tech surgery and that of ‘exotic’ drugs like viagra. In
short, the information-communication revolution refocuses the attention of the
health care system on tertiary level services that are, by definition, more expensive
than essential public health.
9. Conclusions
The classical model propounded by Jamison and others rightly predicted that the
developing countries are undergoing a demographic as well as epidemiological
transition. Consequently, chronic diseases will account for an increasingly greater
portion of morbidity and mortality than communicable diseases. To a certain point
and primarily at the macro level, these shifts are taking place. However, the
classical model needs to be revisited and reviewed in the context of new realities.
Developing countries are confronted with new challenges and constraints that
adversely affect the health care systems making the predicted epidemiological
transition yet to take hold.
Unplanned urbanization resulting into slums, poverty and environmental degra-
dation is one such challenge. Concentrated in slums, the poor and the disadvan-
taged suffer from a disproportionate share of existing and resurgent communicable
diseases. Globalization, on the other hand, is increasing inter- and intra-national
inequities. As multinational corporations become more powerful, the nation states
in the developing world lose their ability to influence policy or programs. Nation
Table 11
The health systems: increasing private sector role
Expenditure on health care Per capita expenditure in $Country
Public (%) Private (%) Public Private Total
54 6 7Bangladesh 1346
27Egypt 73 12 32 44
87 4 19India 2313
Indonesia 181086337
62 87426Nepal
Nigeria 28 72 8 22 30
23 77Pakistan 4 13 17
Uganda 149535 65
20 80 3 14 17Vietnam
Source: World development report, World Bank, 1998/99 [27].
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states, therefore, can hardly initiate credible health sector reform. Moreover,
increasing debt burden is seriously eroding the financial viability of nation states.
As debt servicing is taking an increasing portion of their budgets, developing
countries find it extremely difficult to allocate sufficient resources for the health
sector. Consequently, the health sector is increasingly being dominated by the
private sector. Needless to say, the private sector is more inclined to invest in
tertiary level care than primary health care. Information and communication
revolution epitomized by the Internet and other forms of mass media also rein-
forces the ‘glamour’ of high-tech care raising expectations among the people in
developing countries.
Two conclusions can be reached. One, the classical model of demographic
transition leading to an epidemiological one is not taking place as smoothly or
rapidly as predicted in most developing countries. Second, the health care sys-
tems in these countries are faced with multiple new challenges—unplanned ur-
banization, the HIV/AIDS pandemic and globalization leading to increased
marginalization and an information-communication revolution that boost expec-
tation for high-tech interventions. The nation states in the developing world are
fast abandoning the health care turf to the private sector leading to further
degradation of essential public health. Consequently, much of the developing
world is faced with three burdens simultaneously— the burden of rapidly grow-
ing population, that of still continuing and/or resurgent communicable diseases
and the added burden of chronic diseases. Quite often, disease burdens are
concentrated in ‘pockets of poverty’—urban slums and/or rural hinterlands.
Health sector reform, in order to protect/promote equity, must identify these
pockets of poverty, environmental degradation and (communicable) disease at
the sub-national level. In other words, data must be analyzed at the micro-level,
as national level macro data do not always portray the situation correctly.
Moreover, the developing countries are fast losing the flexibility to set policies
and programs according to their unique needs. These new challenges, on the one
hand, reinforces the need for health sector reform and, on the other, demon-
strates the constraints that the system must overcome in order to initiate any
meaningful change.
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